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Security research recognizes the effect of “being 
seen” in reducing the likelihood of security violations 
in the workplace. This has typically been construed in 
the context of formal monitoring processes by 
employers, but there is an emerging notion that 
workers care about what their workplace colleagues 
think of them and their activities. We leverage this idea 
of the “Eyes of Others” in motivating pro-security 
behaviors to apply to security contexts. We find that, 
for a set of worker self-perceptions including Morality 
and Self-Consciousness, the likelihood of engaging in 
mundane workplace security violations is impacted by 
the knowledge that coworkers are watching. This has 
important implications for novel expansions of  
deterrence research in IS Security, going forward.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
Organizations rely heavily on their information 
systems, and for this reason the need to protect 
confidential information and reduce information 
security risks has become vital [2]. As is widely agreed 
in the literature, company employees (corporate 
insiders, to use the rubric) are the weak link in the 
organizational security chain [7, 8, 31], and improving 
the employees’ security awareness and compliance 
has always been a crucial task [2]. Most of the research 
has focused on formal security policies and the factors 
which have led to their breach or observance, with an 
eye towards building a better security cultures in firms. 
Hence,  there is a lack of consideration for informal 
factors which may influence employee security 
compliance behavior. One of these factors is a 
potential violator’s awareness of being overseen by 
onlookers in the workplace, when contemplating 
behavior that violates the security policies of the firm.  
We characterize this onlooker dynamic on the part 
of coworkers watching each other as the “Eyes of 
Others” in terms of the potential motivational impact 
that the knowledge of being seen in performance of 
some sanctioned activity might have on perpetrators. 
The organizational behavior literature has a number of 
interesting examples of the onlooker effect and how it 
influences employee behavior, ranging from social 
desirability effects of being seen with the “right 
group” [6], to the influence of peers and their visibility 
during the performance workplace activities [22, 28] 
to actual technology use implications related to 
influences on workplace behavior arising from the 
knowledge of being seen by others using some 
inappropriate technological application in the 
workplace [26].  
Individuals, whether at work or in their private 
lives, are vulnerable to the self-perceived perceptions 
of others in their groups of association [6], and our 
view is that this interpersonal approval dynamic can 
influence how workers adhere to security policy 
practices when their activity is discernable by their 
coworkers. As we consider the literature, however, we 
see several studies reinforcing the impact of onlooker 
awareness on individuals [11, 25], but nothing specific 
to the likely influence it might have on security 
practices; hence, this remains a fruitful area for 
inquiry.  
The onlookers we consider as influencing these 
interesting peer-pressure effects in the workplace are 
actors for whom the coworker’s action is visible, but 
who are not directly involved in the coworkers’ 
activities [22, 26].  We call this peer visibility effect 
the “Eyes of Others,” and suggest that it is probative 
for preventing security violations in the workplace in 
addition to likely influencing pro-security behaviors, 
as well.     
To that end,  the purpose of this paper is to develop 
and begin the validation process for measures that can 
be used to assess onlooker effects which may 
influence security behaviors in the workplace.  We 
consider that, in addition to developing the emergent  
“Eyes of Others” construct, a second contribution of 
this study might be the development of a set of 
measures for mundane workplace security violations, 
as there are no formal measurement inventories for 
such violations in the literature.  
The paper proceeds as follows:  after a brief review 
of the onlooker effect, we describe our methodology 
for measure development and then report the results of 
a  study of a model that examines the impact of the  





“Eyes of Others” construct on an inventory of typical  
workplace security policy violations. We conclude 
with theoretical directions and applications for 
measures of the onlooker effect and security 
violations.  
 
2. The onlooker effect:  Eyes of others.    
 
Individuals are not alone in the workplace;  most 
of the time they have colleagues around who may play 
an informal, even inadvertent,  monitoring role as 
regards the propriety of certain technology use 
behaviors on the job. Onlookers are those who are 
available in a situation and are aware of another 
individual’s action by seeing or hearing it but are not 
personally involved in the action, themselves, other 
than as observers. The onlooker role in the specific 
context of unauthorized use of personal technology at 
work has been discussed [26], in the specific setting of 
handheld personal devices in medical workplaces. 
This work suggests that onlookers’ inferences, 
judgments, and reactions can trigger users to reflect on 
consequences of their unauthorized technology use 
and to adjust their use as a result.   
There are a variety of different onlooker influences 
to be found in workplaces: coworkers serve as 
onlookers [12, 30], as do managers [19] and even more 
informal collegial workplace relationships [26]. Co-
workers provide a positive point of context for 
beneficial self-evaluation [6], but also serve as a social 
touchpoint for the value of working relationships [28], 
as a point of influence in organizational change [22], 
and as a preventive influence in mediating negative 
behaviors [11].  
 
2.1. The onlooker effect and deterrence 
 
The tie to behavioral security research for the 
importance of understanding the onlooker effect 
would come through various applications of 
deterrence theory [9, 10, 16]. Though the specific 
presence of social “others” viewing potential security 
breaches is not explicitly treated in the deterrence 
theory literature on information security, there are 
plentiful implications for a social role in prevention. 
One factor is embarrassment or shame that might arise 
from a perpetrator realizing that others in the 
workplace know of his/her inappropriate activities [9]. 
While classic deterrence approaches to IS security are 
comprised explicit influence factors such as likelihood 
of punishment, severity of punishment and speed of 
punishment for infractions, the notion of shame arising 
from the knowledge of the infraction on the part of 
others having a deterrent effect cannot be discounted. 
Deterrence theory approaches to behavioral IS 
security also consider the role that formal monitoring 
plays in preventing infractions [10], indicating that, to 
date, the monitoring effect in deterrence models has 
largely been construed as organizational surveillance 
of computer use. Even so, there is an undercurrent in 
the deterrence theory literature on IS security that 
implicitly acknowledges a potential role of “social 
others” in motivating against security infractions [16].  
We seek to clarify the impact of the onlooker effect 
and to provide a validated measure of the phenomenon 
so that future research can operationally specify the 
effect with more precision as an aspect of models in 
which social dynamics are utilized in understanding 
user compliance with security policies. 
 
3. Initial steps in measure development  
 
This study documents the exploratory and 
confirmatory phases of measure development for the 
“eyes of others” construct, following orthodox 
methods of analysis [5, 20]. The first step, specifying 
the domain of construct, can take an inductive or 
deductive approach [19] and with no prior measures 
available for measuring the onlooker effect (what we 
call “Eyes of Others”), the inductive approach was 
chosen. We induced the domain of the construct 
through qualitative inquiry, engaging in a focus group 
encounter with a group of graduate students in 
information assurance.   
 
3.1. Item generation: Focus research 
 
A group of 20 MBA students with a concentration 
in security were recruited for focus research to explore 
the domain of the Eyes of Others construct. They were 
asked about the nature of their security perceptions  
and for purposes of developing definitions of 
processes and factors that might arise from the 
presence of informal onlookers in the workplace and 
their influence on security behaviors.  
The group interview process provided us the 
ability to examine these perceptions in-depth with 
security-trained individuals, regarding their views of  
security processes, typical security breaches and 
hypothetical motivations for either following or not 
complying with security policies. These questions 
were  couched as hypothetical in our interactions to 
avoid social desirability issues in response [4].  
The result of our focus research was a distillation 
of key terms and definitions which could be used for 
questionnaire development in order to measure 
onlooker effects on motivations for security 
compliance.  
Page 4896
3.1.1. Descriptive terms for development.  Words 
used by respondents in the qualitative inquiry include 
“Observed,” speaking to the knowledge of being 
overseen in the conduct of some activity. The terms 
“Guilt,” “Self-Conscious,” “Penalty,” “Anxiety,” and 
“Nervous” spoke to preventive motivational factors 
that might arise in response to knowledge of the 
presence of “the eyes of others” during a security 
violation.  
Terms that implied motivations that would serve 
to support pro-security behaviors, when in the 
presence of others, included “Personal Integrity,” 
“Personality Traits,” “Security Code,” “Morality,” 
“Concern,” “Safety,” and “Trust.” “Pressure” and 
“Enforcement” spoke to factors related to 
organizational mediation of security behaviors, in the 
eyes of others.  
 
3.1.2. Descriptive terms for security violations.  A 
search of the literature revealed a surprising lack of 
scales for measuring mundane workplace security 
violations. On the one hand, these behaviors come 
under the ready rubric of things that “everybody 
knows,” but on the other hand, a more detailed 
analysis of such behaviors seemed warranted, if used 
for purposes of benchmarking performance of our 
Eyes of Others construct.  
To that end, we engaged in the identification of 
industry sources of information for security violations, 
and through the consideration of popular press 
information available from Chief Security Officer 
groups [15], Fortune 500 technology companies [23] 
and popular security sites online [27] we compiled a 
list of highly typical mundane workplace security 
violations:  password sharing, laxity in maintaining 
anti-malware protection software, use of personal 
storage devices inside the company firewall, personal 
web surfing on company computers, and personal 
email use at work that involves downloading of 
attachments.  
 
3.2. Initial testing 
  
One hundred and four students majoring in 
computer information systems from a College of 
Business in a large university in the United States 
participated in a survey questionnaire for further 
model development. In developmental studies of new 
theory where broad generality is not the specific goal, 
students are generally considered useful subjects 
owing to advantageous homogeneity of variance 
considerations in theoretical development [3].  As we 
are entering the initial phases of defining and assessing 
the “Eyes of Others” construct, we consider this an 
appropriate tradeoff.  
The questionnaire conveyed questions on two 
areas: the first part contained five items measuring the 
likelihood of engaging in mundane security violations, 
which we developed from sources in industry.  The 
second part contained 14 descriptive Eyes of Oth3ers 
items developed in our qualitative pretest.   
 
3.3. Exploratory refinements of the model 
 
An initial exploration of factor structure was 
undertaken in order to determine the number of 
dimensions underlying the construct. Table 1 and 
Table 2 shows the factor loadings for the security 
violation and Eyes of Others construct, respectively. 
Three onlooker dimensions arose, along with two 
security violation. Onlooker factors were Tension, 
Morality and Self-Conscious; security violation  
factors were Violator and Loafer.     
 
Table 1. Factor loadings on  
security violation items 
 Component 
 Violator Loafer 
Sharing Password -.039 .844 
Antivirus .286 .678 
USB .674 .237 
Surfing .804 .188 
Personal Email .818 -.079 
 
Table 2. Factor loadings on  
eyes of others items 
 
Component 
Tension Morality Self-Conscious 
Penalties .104 .125 .715 
Observe .077 .177 .840 
Nervous .414 .087 .690 
Guilty .372 .376 .645 
Conscience .109 .810 .249 
Integrity .098 .820 .305 
Environment .315 .174 .478 
Personality .497 .021 .115 
Morality .223 .849 .069 
Stressful .733 .302 .184 
Trust .806 .172 .166 
Anxious .788 .182 .215 
Concern .299 .523 .080 




As can be seen in the initial model of factor 
structure, where all paths between all constructs were 
explored (shown in Figure 1, with annotations), only 
two links between Eyes of Others constructs and 
Security Violations constructs arose for further 
consideration:   Self-Consciousness and Morality, and 
in each case, only as regards their impact on the 
Violator dimension of security violations. A reduction 
in model structure was justified for further 
consideration based on the t-values for associated 
structural linkages, and this appears in Figure 2, 
showing just the Morality and Self-Consciousness 
constructs modeled against the Violator construct of 
mundane workplace security violations.  
 
 
Figure 2. Reduced PLS model 
Figure 1. Initial PLS model 
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3.4. Likely measurement properties of 
evolving indicators 
 
A prudent step in exploratory measure 
development projects such as this is to consider the 
likely measurement properties of the proffered scale, 
related to trait validity; one way to check these factors 
is through the calculation of the Modified Multi-Trait 
Multi-Method matrix (MMTMM) [21].  
In such an analysis, a calculation of weighted 
scores of each indicator in the model (weighted by its 
PLS path weight) is summed into a composite score 
for all indicators on the construct, which can then be 
compared in a correlation matrix for its fidelity with 
the actual indicators, themselves. The product of this 
analysis is shown in Table 3 for diagnostic use, and 
this information guided  final revisions to the 
exploratory model.  
 
The MMTMM analysis is intended to provide 
support for convergence and discrimination on the part 
of a proffered set of measures when the indicators on 
a given construct correlate highly with the composite 
scores for the respective construct, and at the same 
time do not correlate highly with composite scores for 
different constructs. In our case, Morality and Self-
Consciousness are the Eyes of Others constructs we 
are examining in the matrix, and their performance is 
indicated by the strong correlations seen for 
MoralComp (the composite for the Morality construct) 
with the actual Morality construct indicators 
(Conscience, Integrity and Morality) as well as in 
ConscComp (the composite score for Self-
Consciousness construct) with its actual indicators 
(which are Penalties, Observed, Nervous and Guilty).  
As can be seen by the annotations on the matrix in 
Table 3, excellent on-construct correlations are 
obtained for almost every indicator, the sole exception 
being the Guilty indicator which loads strongly across 
both constructs.  
 Since the Guilty indicator loads with its regular 
group of items on the Self-Consciousness construct, it 
cannot necessarily be said that it does not converge 
with the related scale items. It can, however be said 
that it does not discriminate against related but distinct 
constructs (Morality, in this case) owing to its cross 
loading at better than .5. For this reason the conclusion 
was to remove the indicator from the inventory and re-
fit the model without it.  
One last version of the PLS model was specified 
with the Guilty indicator removed, and this is shown 
in Figure 3, below. A second MMTMM was then 
calculated for good measure without the Guilty 
indicator (see Table 4), and shows, as annotated, the 
expected strong on-construct and weak off-construct 
loadings supportive of trait validity for the remaining 
set of indicators for the two constructs.  
 




Figure 3. Final reduced model 
Table 4. Final modified MTMM 
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4. Implications for evolving measure 
development of “Eyes of Others” 
 
The most parsimonious form of the model that we 
specify indicates interesting relationships between the 
Morality and Self-Consciousness “Eyes of Others” 
constructs and the Violator factor for typical 
workplace security violations. This is an initial foray 
into the exploration of the domain of the emergent 
Eyes of Others construct. To that end, we choose to 
interpret our findings tentatively; the results provide 
significant insight into the further development of an 
Eyes of Others measurement inventory. Our review of 
the security literature suggests the likely usefulness of 
modeling an onlooker effect in workplace security 
behavior, which can perhaps be linked to evolutions of 
the deterrence theory models in found in prior studies 
[9, 10, 16]  since they correspond well with what we 
see in our exploration of the Eyes of Others construct, 
here.  
The typical deterrence theory framework, which 
is where we see the onlooker effect potentially fitting 
in future research, typically specifies the influence of 
motivating factors such as punishments, including 
their likelihood and severity [9, 10], but also the likely 
role that knowledge of being monitored by sanctioning 
authorities for compliance might play in motivating 
pro-security behaviors (or, preventing violations) [10]. 
There is very little in the security literature leveraging 
deterrence theory that provides an avenue for applying 
peer oversight, but there are some implications well 
worth investigating as further refinements are made to 
the Eyes of Others construct and its measures.  
For instance, the implication for self-perceived 
“shame” in the knowledge of workplace others of 
one’s inappropriate security activities [9] might 
correspond with what we are learning here about 
onlooker effects. Certainly, the role of formal 
monitoring is well acknowledged, but at the same time 
certain authors have speculated on the role of “social 
others” in serving as a factor to potentially prevent 
violations [16]. 
To that end, what we learn in the final version of 
our reduced model (Figure 3), has implications worth 
considering for future Eyes of Others measure use and 
final validation steps in the context of a nomological 
network arising from existing theory. We can easily 
see that a sense of morality augurs against committing 
violations, particularly in the view of others. This 
seems to imply a notion that workers of strong moral 
fiber would not want to be seen violating their moral 
codes by others. That is a useful implication, to the 
extent that employees with that sort of orientation can 
be identified for recruitment, or if the characteristics 
of morality can be “trained up” in keeping with the 
robust role of SETA programs in the deterrence theory 
perspective on IS security [10].  
The Self-Consciousness construct speaks to more 
basic and better-understood security dynamics; this 
construct is indicated by measures that are 
thematically related to deterrence precepts. Being 
nervous about being observed, in conjunction with 
concern about penalties for security violations and the 
overarching role of being observed in causing such 
outcomes,  is a far closer match with deterrence theory 
precepts. The issue here, in this exploratory analysis, 
is the causal influence of Self-Consciousness on 
violations. With a positive link arising in our 
modeling, as compared the more easily interpreted 
negative link for the Morality-Violator relationship, 
more investigation is required to understand its true 
nature as to the influence Self-Consciousness plays on 
security violation propensity or prevention. One 
interpretation, purely speculative, of course, might be 
that where Morality clearly serves to prevent mundane 
security violations such as personal USB use or 
personal email attachment downloads, the Self-
Conscious worker might be more concerned about 
things that bear specific, severe  and highly undesired 
penalties (per deterrence precepts), and might not be 
as concerned about things that “everybody does” and 
which likely bear minimal organizational sanction.  
 
4. Conclusion and implications for future 
research  
 
This is an exploratory study, aimed at putting 
operational substance into the concept of onlooker 
effects in the form of the “Eyes of Others,” which 
connotes the informal surveillance of workplace 
activities by coworkers.  Our goal was to initiate the 
operationalization of the construct, and, secondarily, 
to benchmark a group of measures for mundane 
workplace security violations. Given the lack of 
objectively benchmarked measures for mundane 
security violations in the literature, that outcome, 
alone, has probative value for future research. 
Measures of security violations, however, were not the 
primary goal of our study; rather, they are a mere 
convenience for purposes of exploratory modeling of 
our key construct of interest, “Eyes of Others,” which 
we have explicated and initially explored, here.  
To that  end, we have achieved our objective by 
exploring the domain of the informal onlooker effect 
construct, examining dimensionality and investigating 
preliminary cause and effect relationships with the 
security violation factors that we specified. The next 
step in the evolution of the process is to examine the 
emergent constructs and their prospective measures in 
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a broad sample of useful generality for confirmatory 
analysis.   
It is clear that there is a time and a place for 
exploratory investigations that leverage conveniently 
accessed students for a starting point. The precision of 
execution and statistical benefits of homogeneity of 
variance found in such samples are strong benefits 
from these samples [3]. The generality of student 
samples is the typical weakness [1]. Our sample was 
thematically useful, being comprised of students 
trained in an IS security program; many of them had 
employment positions in technological workplaces, 
particularly at the graduate level, but the fact remains 
that this work is based on student samples and is 
explicitly limited by that.  For that reason, we clearly 
delimit our findings and their implications to the 
typical benefit of any exploratory study: this is a 
starting point for something truly interesting, and the 
real work lies ahead in conducting a rigorous 
confirmatory analysis with a broad sample of 
generality, such as technology industry workers in full 
time employment.  
Until that time, what we have learned here 
suggests to us that deterrence theory perspectives, 
particularly those which speculate on the potential 
influence of social others [16], are excellent departure 
points for further exploration of the Eyes of Others 
construct in broader and more general contexts.  It is 
well understood that people in every walk of life, but 
particularly in their place of work, prize the positive 
approval of their peers [6], and this peer group 
normative influence can easily be leveraged for useful 
pro-security outcomes when artfully managed by the 
firm, is our general sense from what we have learned 
in this study.  
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